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Evolution of the restrictive system
1. Introduction1
The early 1960's marked a major change in the direction of Ghanaian
external economic policy. A relatively free system of international trade and
payments was replaced by a restrictive foreign-exchange regime involving b
licencing and exchange control. The consequences for the structure and per- p
formance of the Ghanaian economy were profound. In this chapter we set the
stage by examining the evolution of the system.
The history of the restrictive exchange regime is one of hasty introduction,
difficult implementation, frequent change, organized corruption, serious
shortages, and finally an attempted liberalization. To provide an overview of q
thehistory we begin in section 2 by characterizing the system as a serbs of
phases (see also Appendix F-2). Given the outline provided by the phases,we a
analyze in subsequent sections the various instruments used to influence the
foreign-exchange market, reporting several indicators of restrictiveness. There
has been a great variety of instruments available and used; some consciously
adopted to achieve foreign-exchange objectives, others only inadvertently
brought to bear on the situation. First, there are those such as taxes and
I
subsidieson trade which introduce an explicit price differential and leave
quantities to adjust. These are treated in section 3. Second, some instruments
operate by affecting the financing available for foreign transactions. These we
deal with in section 4. Third, there are instruments such as licences which
restrict quantities and leave the corresponding domestic prices to adjust. We a
discuss these in section 5. Finally, there are instruments such as fiscal and
monetary policies which affect the levels of aggregate demand and overall q
domestic prices. We consider these instruments in section 6, not so much
because they were heavily relied upon but more because they were frequently
1.This chapter draws heavily on both the documentary record and interviews with
Ghanaian officials past and present. While exonerating the latter from any responsi-
bility for what is contained here, I wish to acknowledge their generous assistance. In
particular,I would like to single out for special thanks S.K. Botchway, R.K.O.
Djang, H.P. Nelson, J. Phillips, and Dr. J. Ofon-Atta. Valuable research assistance
for this chapter was provided at various stages by M. Behkish, E. Hail, and S.M.
Ntim.r
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forgotten in the proliferation of approaches to the foreign exchange prob-
lem.2
It is important to keep in mind that all instruments willaffectthe ex-
change regime's restrictiveness. Hçnce in the following delineation of phases
based on varying degrees of restrictiveness we have attempted to take an
overview of the entire set, even though most of our quantitative indicators
refer only to taxes on trade.
2. Delineation of phases
The Ghanaian experience with a restrictive foreign-exchange regime has
been one of both sudden and gradual changes, making a precise delineation of
phases subject to a necessarily arbitrary selection of dates.3 With this qualifi-
cation in mind, the following sequence represents a brief survey of the restric-
tive regime. An overview of the phases set against several key economic
variables is contained in Chart lI-i.
(a) Liberal regime, 1950—1961 (Phase V)
Ghana, as a member of the sterling area, was subject to the general pres-
cription of currency requirements of the area as a whole. Payments to and
from other countries of the area were relatively free while payments to and
from countries outside the area were subject to the sterling restrictions.
Within this framework Ghana experienced a fairly liberal regime.
The most interesting feature of this period was the rapid buildup of for-
eign exchange reserves in the boom years of the Korean war, followed by a
gradual drawing down of the large reserve accumulation. After independence
in 1957 the drawing down of reserves accelerated, still largely within a per-
missive liberal system (see Table A.3b). The acceleration of reserve loss con-
tinued, to the point that in 1961 the payments pressure had become unten-
able and controls were rapidly imposed.
(b) Imposition of controls, 1961—1963 (Phase 1)
A variety of instruments were brought to bear on the rapidly growing
balance-of-payments deficit. Initially exchange control was extended to in-
2.We do not wish to overdraw the distinctions among the various instruments. For
example, stiff new indirect taxes on trade will dampen aggregate demand while
implementation of fiscal policy may require changes in taxes on trade. Our distinc-
tions are made largely as a means of organizing the discussion.
3.The phase numbers refer to those set out below, Appendix F-2. Detailed description
will be found in J.N. Bhagwati and A.O. Krueger, Exchange Control, Liberalization,
Development: Experience and Analysis, forthcoming.dude the sterling area, several bilateral trade and payments pacts were launch-
ed, and an attempt was made to employ conventional methods to suppress
aggregate demand in general and demand for imports in particular. On current
account any effect these might have had was swamped by speculative de-
mand for imports in anticipation of licencing. The apparently inevitable appli-
cation of import licencing came on December 1, 1961.
fd
th
6 Evolution of the Restrictive System De







$ .-- —Delineation of Phases 7
During1962 the new restrictive system was sorted out, and was reasonably
settled by year end. It continued with a few minor changes during most of
1963. The level and distribution of exchange allocations were based on esti-
mated foreign-exchange availability and perceived national needs (e.g., im-
port-substitution, industrialization, and diversification of trade toward East
Bloc countries).
(c) Breakdown of system, 1964—1966 (Phase II)
Beginning in late 1963 the system experienced a variety of changes, the
most notable of which was the introduction of substantial corruption in the
issue of import licences. Changes in regulations were frequent in a frantic
attempt to patch up a system that had one big hole in it: the corrupt and
erratic issue of import licences. This culminated in a splurge of imports and
massive assumption of short-term debt for 1965. The country was left with a
foreign debt amounting to about one-half of Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
and no substantial new lines of credit at the time of the coup d'etat over-
throwing President Nkrumah in early 1966.
(d) Austerity and devaluation, 1966—1967 (Phase III)
The military-civilian National Liberation Council (NLC) government that
replaced Nkrumah chose to follow a "stabilization" program in which dejure
the system changed little, but de facto involved a resumption of the type of
controls employed in 1962 and 1963 (prior to the massive corruption of
1964—1966) combined with the imposition of a substantial expenditure reduc-
tion. Temporary relief of payments pressure was also achieved by a major
rescheduling of short-term external debt.
It soon became evident to both the government and to outside official
agencies supporting its efforts that these policies were not enough to contain
the payments pressure. In July 1967 Ghana resorted to major devaluation.
(e) Import liberalization, 1967—1970 (Phase IV)
The devaluation was a turning point in the direction of gradual liberaliza-
tion of the trade and payments regime. Beginning with a few moves at the
time of devaluation and continuing for over three years, both the NLC gov-
ernment and the government of Prime Minister Busia (elected in 1969) gradu-
ally reduced the specific import-licence list to the point that by the end of
1970 about 60 per cent of all imports had been removed from the specific
licencelist. The task of dismantling the complex import-control syster
proved difficult, and because many controls still remained in place the
pected benefits were slow to emerge. Further, a number of strategic erron
were made which in the end proved fatal to the import liberalization. Taxes
freed imports were relatively low. Aggregate demand pressure was not8 Evolution of the Restrictive System
contained. And a huge windfall of cocoa export earnings was not treated as
such.
an -
(f)Collapse of import liberalization, 1971—1972 (return to Phase I) rai
When cocoa export revenues resumed more normal levels in 1971 it be-
came evident that external payments were at an unsustainable level. The open frl
deficit would somehow have to be closed. Despite this, imports were further
liberalized in mid-1971, and no substantial moves to dampen the demand for lai
imports were taken. As the payments pressure accelerated during late 1971
the need for a quick solution became pressing. Still fully committed to the
import liberalization approach they had adopted, only two options appeared pa
feasible to the government: debt relief and devaluation. Very little debt relief rn
was obtained, and the government chose not to repudiate any of the debts. ex
Instead, it settled on a huge devaluation of nearly 80 per cent. The jolt of the ye'
sudden reduction in real income implied by the devaluation was too much for efi
the fragile political situation. The military stepped in, with evident popular
support. to end both the experiment in democratic government and the im-
port liberalization.
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to a detailed discussion of Phases Si
I, IT and III. Phase IV and the return to Phase I are taken up in Chapter V.
3. Taxes on foreign trade
By far the most important and extensively used instruments have been
taxes on trade. Initially employed primarily as a source of government reve-
flue, trade taxes came. subsequently to be used as a balance-of-payments
instrument. Because they have been so significant in the Ghanaian experience Cl
they merit extended consideration. We begin by reviewing the mechanisms el
whereby trade taxes affect the foreign.exchange market, and then examine
the magnitudes of taxes employed.
Underlying the generation and use of foreign exchange are the domestic U
markets in which exporters are paid and importers pay in local currency for
the goods and services that are sold on or purchased from international mar-
kets. If there are taxes on these transactions the rates at which domestic el
offers and demands of local currency (new cedis or for dollars rise will
differ from the rates at which national offers and demands are made. On the
export side a tax means that exporters receive fewer new cedis per dollar than
the nation does. And on the import side tariffs mean that the importers pay
more new cedis per dollar of imports than the nation does. The rates of tax
____1-'in Taxes on Foreign Trade 9
aS indicate the degree of divergence or "distortion"4 facing the sellers of exports
and purchasers of imports vis-'a-vis the international market in one way: as
rates with respect to the international prices of the goods. These sates can be
converted into rates in terms of the foreign-exchange market and subtracted
from (export tax) or added to (import tariff) the official exchange rate to
yield effective exchange rates: the new cedis earned by an exporter per dol-
lar's worth of exports and the new cedis paid by importers per dollar's worth
of imports.
e Algebraically, for each of the export and import sides a rate of new cedis
per dollar facing the exporter or importer can be expressed in the following
f manner. For the exporter the new cedi receipts are less than in national
export values by proportion of the ad vatorem export tax rate (tx). Con-
e verting this at the official new cedis per dollar exchange rate (r) yields the
effective exchange rate on exports
ir
EERX =1— (ILl)
Similarly, on the import sidewhere tmis the ad valorem tariff rate on
imports, the effective exchange rate on imports (EERm) is:
EERm =(1+ tm)r. (11.2)
For a number of reasons the effective exchange rate may change without a
o change in the official exchange rate. Anything that alters the new cedis that
purchasers of imports pay for a dollar's worth of imports or exporters receive
:s for a dollar's worth of exports will alter the relevant effective exchange rate.
e Changes in the rate of export tax or import tariff will clearly change the
5 effective exchange rate. So also will the introduction of some new levy or
e transfer that is a function of exporting or importing.
Examples of this type of change include the introduction of a compulsory
c 180-day deferred payment or credit for imports5 and a1 percent import
licence fee, which add to the degree of distortion and hence increase the
effective exchange rate on imports. Further, a change in the ad valorem
equivalent rate of tax or tariff may come about even in the absence of
11 explicit action. Such is the case of cocoa where the divergence between
e
fl
4."Distortion" in this sense carries no normative connotation, Rather, it is a concept
used in theory to refer to the existence of some change in a relationship. In this case
the one to one relationship between domestic and international prices of a tradeable
-
- isaltered or "distorted" by a trade tax.
Payment in foreign exchange to suppliers of imports is deferred 180 days from the
time of local currency payment by the importer.10 Evolutionof the Restrictive System
producer receipts and national export receipts is a residual -that depends on
the arbitrarily fixed producer price6 and the constantly moving export price.
On the import side most tariffs are scheduled at ad valorem rates, but exemp-
tions are numerous and arbitrary, yielding constant changes in the average
effective import exchange rates even at the most disaggregated level. Putting
all these together, we have calculated the rates of trade taxes facing importers
and exporters over the period since 1955, and in turn the corresponding
effective exchange rates.
(a) Import effective exchange rate
The data for the import side are contained in Table 11.1. Note first the
gradual proliferation of instruments.7 For many years only the tariff was
used, but in the 1960's the authorities resorted first to a purchase tax.8
followed by a sales tax.9 a [80-day compulsory credit scheme,10 the small
import licence fee.11 and finally surcharges.12 The overall sum of these
instruments traced out a fairly constant path of the effective import-exchange
rate from 1955 through 1960. an accelerated rise through 1965, and a decline
6.The producer price at the buying stations scattered throughout the country is fixed
without direct reference to the world price and is kept constant for periods ranging
up to several years.
7.Omitted from these calculations are the effects of various instruments used to
control the financing of foreign trade set out in section 4 below. Their omission is
due to their small and generally non-quantifiable effects.
8.Instituted July 1961 and applied almost entirely to imported manufactured goods.
Abolished January 1965 on all but motor vehicles in conjunction with increased
tariff rates.
9.Applied to both imported and domestic goods, but dampening demand for imports.
It is administered as a manufacturer's sales tax. Act dated 21 January, 1965.
10. Instituted March 1965. M.J. Sharpston in his forthcoming study "The Costs of
Trade and Tariff Policy: The Case of Ghana," Cambridge University Dept. of Ap-
plied Economics, OccasionalPaper.Chap. 3, develops estimates of the import-cost
inflation due to this scheme. His estimates range from 6 percent to 20 percent of the
invoice value, depending on the nature of the goods and size of the importer. This is
made up of the allowed 6 percent per annum interest cost plus higher prices of
goods due to export credit cover, loss of cash discount, and the cost of using
confirming houses. As a conservative estimate of the average effect we have assumed
an 8 percent of c.i.f. value cost inflation due to this scheme. This is made up of 5
percent higher price charged by suppliers and a 3 percent allowance for interest (at 6
percent per annum). Aid-financed imports and bilateral trade pact imports are not
subject to this compulsory credit. However, because of the impossibility of sepa-
rating out such imports, in our calculations we applied the average minimum inila-
tion of import cost to total imports.
II. Applicable in 1966. 1967 and 1968 only.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































12 Evolution of the Restrictive System Te
Notes to Table 11-i
Notes:1. See Appendix B for details at the 1-digit SITC level.
2. Entry of [—1 indicates instrument not operative for year.
3. 1967A is January through June; 1967B is July through December. Devalua-
tion July 8, 1967.
4. Exchange rate to July 8, 1967 was NC 0.714286/Si, and after was N4
1.020408/Si.
5. The average effective exchange rate for 1967 (weighted by dollar value of
imports) is, 1.2717
6. 1971, provisional.
Sources:1. Import tariff rates calculated from imports and collections data found in
CBS, Quarterly Digest of Statistics, 1956 —1969.
2. Collections data for purchase tax, sales tax, surcharge, and 1970 and 1971
tariffs supplied by Ghana Customs and Excise. Special thanks for extracting
these data are due to Mr. Quaye of the Statistics Section.
3. The 180-day credit scheme effect calculated on assumption that it increased
the ci.f. price by 5 percent (and hence included in the base for the duty and
other collections) plus the allowable 6 percent per annum (i.e., 3 percent of
value) interest cost.
from 1965 through 1969: which, however, was more than offset by the 1967
official devaluation. These direct price divergences accounted for a 22 percent
devaluation of the import effective exchange rate 1955 through 1971. Taking
into account the 43 percent official devaluation in 1967, the effective price
of foreign exchange facing importers increased by 75 percent over the period
1955 to 1971.13
(b) Export effective exchange rate
Turning to the export side, trade taxes have been levied in various forms
on cocoa, wood and timber, and diamonds.14 For cocoa, we have included
the tax implicit in the Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB) surplus of sales value
over purchase and operating costs, while for wood and diamonds we have
used simply the government tax receipts. The results (Table 11.2) clearly
indicate that the major export tax is on cocoa, while wood and diamonds
have been subject to very low rates. This, of course, is due to the fact that
Ghana has employed the cocoa export tax as a device to obtain monopoly
13. These data are in nominal terms only. We adjust for the price level in Table 11-8
below. Note that the effective exchange rate is the product of the import taxes and
the exchange rate.
14. Other minerals (bauxite and manganese) were subject to an export tax in earlier
years, but in 1952 this was changed to an internal mineral duty, and revised again in
1962. As it now stands the minerals tax is implicitly a royalty payment on a sliding














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































14 Evolution of the Restrictive System
profitsfrom cocoa, while for the other exports such a strategy is not possible 4
because of Ghana's insignificant shares of the world market.
The implicit cocoa export tax exhibits considerable instability, due largely
to the policy of fixed producer prices in the face of variable supply and stable
cocoa export earnings. Consequently, the changes in implicit tax revenue that
emerge are in large part due to the changes in the volume produced and
shipped by Ghana.15 The bumper crop of 1964 is the clearest example of a d
low tax due to high volunie, while in the later 1960's the lower volume meant
an increased tax rate. For wood and timber the tax rate rose up to the time of
the 1967 devaluation and declined thereafter, due in part to the specific
nature of the tax, but mostly to reduced levies that accompanied devaluation.
The tax on diamond exports before 1962 was on all diamond exports, but d
from that date applied only to diamonds won (dug) by African diggers and
not to commercial mines which paid instead the internal mineral duty.16 The c
officiallyrecorded output of African diggers virtually disappeared in the
1960's, and as a consequence the export tax rate on diamonds on the whole (
declinedto near zero. The tax was eventually abandoned at the time of the
devaluation. q
Looking at the export and import sides together we see a widening gap
between the effective exchange rates facing average importers and average
(total) exporters. The upward trend in the import rate since 1960, due to
both higher import taxes and the devaluation (which was only slightly offset
by lower import taxes), together with the relative constancy of the total
export tax rate, meant that the excess of the effective exchange rate on
imports over that on total exports rose by about 0.30per dollar from
1955 to 1969. If, however, we exclude cocoa from our export calculations, it
is clear that the major widening of the gap between the import and export
rates took place between 1960 and 1965, with a slight reduction subsequent.
ly. Thus in broad terms the discrimination in favor of import-competing
production and relatively against non-cocoa export production developed
during the period in which quantitative restrictions emerged.
15. On the stability of earnings see J.C. Leith, "Export Concentration and Instability:
The Case of Ghana," EconomicBulletin of Ghana, SecondSeries, Vol. 1, No. 1,
1971. The average annual deviation of earnings from trend for cocoa was about 4.4
percent in the period 1957 through 1965. A good crop, for example. leaves total
cocoa earnings virtually unchanged as the price falls. Yet producers' incomes rise
due to the fixed price they receive, while the tax (which is the residual between
producer and total receipts) falls.
16. See note 14 concerning the internal mineral duty.r
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4. Financing of foreign trade
A further approach used by the Ghanaian government to influence the
foreign exchange market consisted of various devices to affect the financing
of foreign trade. These differ from taxes on trade in that no measurable
explicit commodity price differential is introduced. They are, however, fun-
damentally similar in that they work through the price system in the com-
modity market, and do not involve a suspension of the commodity market as
licences and controls do. 17
Three instruments of this type were used: (1) regulation of payment
terms, (2) regulation of the credit available for foreign trade, and (3) prior
deposits on imports. The first was begun by Exchange Control in early 1962,
while the other two were not introduced until April 1964, when the Bank of
Ghana assumed an expanded role in the regulation of credit.
(a) Regulation of payment terms
With the institution of exchange control and licencing in 1961 it very
quickly became evident to the authorities that improved payment terms on
the part of the Ghanaian importer could be used as a method of offsetting
suppliers' concern over the new restrictions. This had the unwanted effect of
speeding up foreign-exchange payments. Exchange control regulations dealing
with payment for imports were therefore issued (February 1962) and subse-
quently revised from time to time. These regulations required Authorized
Dealers in foreign exchange (i.e., the commercial banks) to ensure that pay-
ment terms conformed with those specified in the import licence and to
obtain a number of supporting documents: manufacturers' and suppliers'
invoices, bill of lading, and customs entry form. In general, payment for
imports could be authorized only against documents (i.e., goods already
shipped) or evidence of importation. Remittances prior to dispatch of goods
could not be made without specific prior approval, and were seldom al-
lowed. 18 Regulations further specified details and/or limits of commission
payments, freight charges, insurance on goods, interest on acceptance bills,
normal bank charges, and rebates on acceptance bills paid before maturity.19
17. The compulsory 180-day credit scheme perhaps falls within this definition, but
because it is translated, virtually automatically, into an implicit price differential we
included it in our discussion of direct price divergences.
18. The stipulation that imports could only be financed by sight or acceptance docu-
ments was repeated in the Commercial and Industrial Bulletin at least twice: 20
March, 1964 and 24 December, 1964.
19. Commercial and !nduttrial Bulletin, 20 December, 1963, quoting from Bank of
Ghana Exchange Control Committee notice of 28 September, 1963.Year For imports Total Percent for imports
1963* 16.9 77.4 21,8
1964* 9.2 75.8 12.1
1965 10.3 68.4 15.1
1966 24.4 66.1 36.9
1967 17.8 58.3 30.5
1968 15.0 55.5 27.0
1969 12.3 67.9 18.1
1970 25.1 80.3 31.3
Note: *Yearend.
Sources:Bank of Ghana, Report of the Board for the Financial Year Ended 30 June,
1965 (for 1963—1965); 1968 (for 1966—1968); and 1970 (for 1969 and
1970).
(h) Regulation of credit
The major measures relating to the finance of foreign trade were contained
in the credit control regulations introduced on April 1, 1964. The general
move to establish credit regulations was clearly part of the evolution of the
Bank of Ghana. into a full-fledged central bank, so the major thrust of these
new regulations was to set out reserve ratios for the commercial banks and to
detail their reporting requirements. In addition, however, two features of the
regulations were of potentially considerable importance for foreign trade.
The first set out a requirement that credit facilities over Nct10,000for
purposes other than agriculture and industry could be made only with the
prior approval of the Bank of Ghana.2° This provided a mechanism for
restricting imports by limiting the credit available to those engaged exclu-
sively in the import trade, but could not prevent multi-activity firms such as
the big trading companies from shifting funds internally. On the surface the
policy appears to have had some initial effect in redirecting credit. Coenmer-
cial bank loans for the import trade dropped absolutely and relatively in 1964
and maintained a fairly low level in 1965 (see Table 11.3). This occurred
despite the general lament by the bank of Ghana that "the effectiveness of
the quantitative credit control regulations might have been greater if the
commercial banks had complied fully with regulations."2' It is doubtful, how-
ever, that the excess demand for imports was substantially reduced by this
device.
20. Commercial and Industrial Bulletin, 17 April, 1964.
21. Bank of Ghana, Report of the Board for the Financial Year Ended 30 June, 1965,
p. 82.
16 Em lotion of the Restrictive System
TABLE 11-3
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(c) Prior deposits
The further device concerning the import trade contained in the 1964
• credit control regulations was the establishment of a minor prior-deposit
system. The scheme for prior deposits on imports, although relativelyinsignif-
icant as an element in the array of restrictive instruments, is in many ways
typical of a proliferation of instruments bearing on the foreign sector. Fur-
ther, its history is indicative of the rapidity of change that is often encoun-
tered at the height of restrictiveness.
Initially, the system announced in April 1964 was one in which commer-
cial banks were required to obtain and hold a 15 percent minimum down
payment before opening a letter of credit for imports of consumer goods,
including consumer durables.22 In June 1964 this was revised by requiring
that the margin be deposited with the Bank of Ghana. A further tightening
took place in December of the same year; the margin was extended to all
imports of consumer goods, regardless of the method of finance, and the
deposit had to be made before the specific licence would beissued.23 This
apparently was not fully enforced, for in June 1965 a request appeared,
addressed to holders of 1965 specific licences for consumer goods, "to pay
forthwith to the Bank of Ghana the mandatory 15 percent cash margin of the
value of the !icences."24 And in July 1965 a repeat request appeared, com-
bined with a modification of the procedures —whichapparently permitted
payment of the deposit after the licence was issued but before the opening of
a letter of credit, or within fourteen days of confirmation of an order tobe
paid by documentary credit.25 This system continued throughout 1966 and
was set out as part of the 1967 licencing procedures announced in July 1966,
but was finally scrapped following the devaluation of July1967.26
An assessment of the effect of the prior deposits is difficult because of
their constant changes and relatively short duration. What is clear is that they
were probably little more than a nuisance for the large importers, asthe cost
was considerably less than one percent of the c.Lf. value and henceprovided
little price deterrent to importation.27
22. Commercial and Industrial Bulletin, 17 April, 1964.
23. Ibid., 24 December, 1964.
24. Ibid., 25 June, 1965.
25. Ibid., 30 July, 1965.
26. The above description is based on the record appearing in the Commercial and
Industrial Bulletin. However, we have been told that some additional changes and
complications took place: for part of 1965 the margin was set at 30 percent, but
only one-half of the margin deposited with the Bank of Ghana; for 1966 some small
margins were established for raw materials (5 percent) and capital goods (1 percent),
but within a few months abolished.
27. Assuming the importer had to borrow the 15 percent margin at 8 percent per annum
for three months, the prior deposit adds 2 percent of 15 percent, i.e., 0.3 percent, to




Another major set of instruments used to affect the foreign-exchange mar-
ket consists of direct quantitative restrictions. Such restrictions are designed r
to place controls on the level and composition of foreign-exchange use.
During 1961 three instruments of this type were applied with substantially d
greater restrictiveness than previously: control of foreign-exchange transac- a
lions, licensing of trade in goods, and bilateral trade and payments agree-
ments. While all these instruments had been in use before 1961, they had e
generally been applied-in a liberal manner. Hence, the 1961 move to tighten
the quantitative controls on international transactions represented a major
shift in Ghanaian economic policy.
C
Underlying thischange was a predilection on the part of President
Nkrumah to controls as an allocative device in bringing about the desired
structural transformation of the colonial economy. A belief in the efficiency
of direct intervention as a solution to all-important economic problems, to-
gether with a desire to re-orient the trade pattern, particularly the geographic
and commodity composition, resulted in a strong push towards controls by
the national leadership. For those in the governing circles with a less inter-
ventionist approach, no substitute for controls seemed available. Traditional
macro methods had allegedly not worked to dampen the level of foreign-
exchange expenditure, and nothing short of controls was apparently available
to achieve the generally accepted objective of transforming the existing struc-
ture into an unspecified "modern" structure. Hence, a broad temporary coali-
tion developed ranging from those who favored a permanent interventionist
role through those who viewed controls as a temporary expedient to be used
while the structural transformation of the economy took place, to those who
regarded controls as an interim measure until more orthodox methods could
be made to work.
In resorting to controls, however, few members of the governing circles
distinguished between their capacity to achieve broad allocative objectives
and their capacity to allocate in the small. The subsequent proliferation of
detailed regulations and the difficulties encountered point up the failure to
appreciate this distinction. The assumption made by most was that controls
could be implemented: that an objective stated and corresponding instru-
ments announced would ensure the achievement of the objective.
The substantial tightening of controls was precipitated, not so much by a
conscious decision to move in that direction, but more in response to a
rapidly deteriorating balance-of-payments situation. Export revenues were
_JQuantitative Restrictions 19
stagnant28 A sharp increase in expenditures on imports of goods and ser-
vices, due initially to a rapid expansion of aggregate demand,29 fed by the
dual expectations that the level of foreign-exchange expenditures would be
sharply curtailed by controls and that the geographic and commodity corn-
position of trade would be altered by bilateral agreements, produced an
intolerably rapid decline in reserves. And, as the inevitability of some form of
drastic remedial action became more obvious, the rise in both merchandise
and non-merchandise payments accelerated3° —tothe point that during the
six months preceding the imposition of stricter exchange control in July 1961
external reserves reportedly fell by more than 69 mi.llion,3' compared
with the December 31, 1960 level of 297 million. And the decline con-
tinued for the rest of the year: reserves dropped by 150 million in
calendar 1961 (Table 11-4).
The sequence of events in 1961 also suggests that government officials had
done little to prepare a comprehensive set of controls. For example, the initial
moves involved the signing of bilateral trade and payments agreements with
severalsocialist and a few African countries, a process which continued
• throughout the year. Recognizing that the only way to engage in significant
trade with socialist countries would be via trade pacts, 16 bilateral pacts were
signed in the period May 1961 through January 1962.32 However, most were
not immediately implemented, and complementary policies to ensure that
imports obtained under such agreements would be marketed competitively
with imports from existing sources were not immediately instituted. The
result was a speculative demand for imports from traditional sources which
fed the growing speculative demand arising from the expectation of overall
28. 1-lowever. the contention that the price deterioration in cocoa produced a decline in
export revenue is not borne out by an examination of the data for 1961. For an
example of this conventional view, cf. Naseem Ahmad, DeficitFinancing, Inflation
and Capital Formation, The Ghanaian Experience 1960-1965. WeltforumVerlag,
Munich. 1970, p. 73.
29. See section 6 below.
30. See Table A-3a. Payments for imports, non-factor services, earnings on investments,
and transfer payments on current account all increased rapidly in 1960 and 1961.
31. Cited by Ahmad, op. cit., p. 74, from Bank of Ghana, Report,June1962, p. 17.
32. The only previous bilateral trade and payments agreement was signed with Israel in
1958. The agreements were: Israel (5July,1958), United Arab Republic (31 May,
1961). Upper Volta (18 June, 1961), Guinea (6 July, 1961), Mali (8 July, 1961),
Peoples' Republië of China (18 August, 1961), Rumania (30 September, 1961),
Bulgaria (5 October, 1961), Albania (7 October, 1961), Yugoslavia (11 October,
1961), Czechoslovakia (16 October, 1961), German Democratic Republic (19 Octo-
ber, 1961), Hungary (23 October, 1961), Holland (26 October, 1961). USSR (4
November. 1961), Dahomey (20 December, 1961), Cuba (27 January, 1962).
Source: IMF, AnnualReport on Exchange Restrictions, 1959and 1962.
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controls. And the authorities were not immediately in a position to control
this demand.
In mid-year, exchange control plus budgetary measures were introduced,
apparently in a belated effort to stem the non-merchandise flow via exchange
control while relying on internal deflation and slightly higher tariffs to dam-
pen the net outflow on merchandise account. Virtually simultaneously, in
July 1961 application of the exchange-control system was widened from
non-sterling accounts to include the sterling area, and an allegedly deflation-
ary budget introduced.
The budgetary moves emphasized orthodox measures designed to deal
with the payments pressure: emphasis was placed on increased government
revenue to contain private demand in general and for imports in particular.
The personal income tax net was widened and personal exemptions abolished,
rates increased and a withholding system instituted. A compulsory savings
plan was also introduced. Finally, a purchase tax and increases in import duty
rates were announced.33
(b) Exchange control
The widening of the exchange-control net to include the rest of the world
may be seen by comparing the nature of exchange restrictions before and
after July 1961. Prior to the instigation of universal exchange control, the
Ghanaian regulations were not unlike those of other sterling area countries.
Visible current account items were subject to licencing and payment restric-
tions designed primarily to discriminate in favor of the area and protect its
overall balance-of-payments position. Imports were subject to licencing, but
Open General Import Licences (OGL), which permitted importation without
prior authorization, covered virtually all commodities from the sterling area
and most other nondollar countries, but only wheat flour from Canada and the
United States.Exchange cover for all permitted imports was provided auto-
matically on application. Exports were also subject to licencing, but again
with a wide range of items covered by Open General Export Licences. The
usual exchange-control requirement to collect (within 6 months of shipment)
While the increased duty rates on individual items were substantial, the increase in
total collections as a percentage of total imports was not large, yielding only an
effective devaluation of the import-exchange rate of less than 4 percent. (See Table
lI-i.)
34. In March 1960 OGL was extended to cover almost all imports from the dollar area.
The previous special treatment accorded wheat flour was apparently designed to
maintain a low price for bread, a procedure typical of many West African countries.
See, for example, Peter Kilby, African Enterprise. The Nigerian Bread Industry.
Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1965.r
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ol and surrender export proceeds applied only to sales to some non-sterling area
countries.
Invisibles transactions were similarly relatively free within the sterling area.
Payments to other territories of the area were not subject to exchange con-
trol, whereas payments outside required approval, and receipts in specified
n non-sterling currency were subject to surrender requirements.
TI On capital account, again no restrictions were placed on movements within
the area, but payments to outside and foreign investment from outside the
area required Exchange Control approval.35
With the institution of universal exchange control in 1961 the discrimina-
tion between the sterling area and the rest of the world was largely dropped
by extending controls to cover the whole world. Exchange cover for licenced
imports was still provided automatically, but exporters to all countries were
S now subject to the six-month collection and surrender requirements. All in-
visible payments were subject to specific individual approval, while the mag-
nitudes of those normally approved were limited. All proceeds from invisibles
had to be surrendered. All capital movements, both in and out, also required
approval. Further, to ensure adequate control over foreign-held balances,
Exchange Control began to centralize all foreign exchange balances into the
hands of the Bank of Ghana. The results, which in 3 years involved a doubling
of the proportion held by the Bank of Ghana, are outlined in Table 114. In
sum, Ghana, rather than the sterling area as a whole, became the unit around
• which the exchange-control wall was built.
The exchange-control system underwent a variety of changes in the period
196 1-1965. Most were the product of a general sorting out of regulations,36
with occasional reversals of policy evident.37
35. Although the official title of the exchange control authorities changed from time to
time, we use the current official designation of Exchange Control throughout this
book.
36. For example, regulations were introduced to require presentation of manufacturers'
and suppliers' invoices (CommercialandIndustrial Bulletin,6September, 1963);
and refunds on air tickets outside Ghana were prohibited (ibid., 2.2 July 1965).
37. Two cases illustrate this point. In 1962 a requirement was introduced that foreign
investors must reinvest at least 60 percent of net profits in Ghana, but this was
repealed the following year (JMF, Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, 1963
and 1964). A second case involved the surrender of foreign-held balances by Gha-
naian residents as specified in the 1961 Exchange Control Act. A reminder appeared
in 1962 (Commercialand Industrial Bulletin.4 May, 1962), but in 1963 a "Special
Unnumbered Licence" (SUL) category for imports was introduced, permitting mdi-
viduals to use foreign-held balances to import goods. See Bank of Ghana notice of
• 28 September, 1963, appearing in ibid.,20December, 1963. SUL imports did not
become a significant portion of total imports, and are therefore omitted from our
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TABLE 114
Ghana's foreign-exchange reserves by holder, 1957 through 1964, year end
Year Bank of Ghana Other Total Percent in
(1) (2) (3) Bank of Ghana
(in millions (in millions (in millions (1)/(3)
of of of (percent)
1957 76.3 270.6 346.9 22.0
1958 78.5 288.0 366.5 21.4
1959 92.6 246.6 339.2 27.3
1960 107.7 189.6 297.3 36.2
1961 86.2 65.2 147.4 58.5
1962 94.5 50.3 144.8 65,3
1963 69.6 17.4 87.0 80.0
1964 65.7 18.1 83.8 78.4
Note:The category marked "Other" includes: Treasury, Cocoa Marketing Board (to
1962), Commercial Banks (negative from 1962), Local Authorities (to 1962),
Higher Educational Institutions (to 1962); plus a small additional "miscella-
neous" factor.
Source:Bank of Ghana, Report of the Board for the Financial Year Ended 30 June,
1965.
Once the sorting out was completed, the system remained virtually static
until 1965 when, faced with an out-of-control situation, Exchange Control
introduced two new and more restrictive regulations. The time permitted to
exporters to collect and surrender their proceeds was reduced from 6 months
to 60 days from the date of shipment. Also, in an apparent attempt to
squeeze foreign-owned firms for more foreign exchange, a regulation was
introduced which required prior Exchange Control approval of domestic
loans and overdrafts to resident companies controlled by non-residents. These
regulations have remained in force since.
(c) Import licencing
Returning to the situation of 1961, one will recall that budgetary measures
and exchange control were introduced in mid-year in an attempt to contain
the balance-of-payments pressure. Despite the budgetary measures the central
government deficit continued to enlarge (see Table A-5), and aggregate
demand pressure on imports was not abated. Further, and probably more
importantly, expectations that the net of controls would be expanded to
include restrictive licencing of merchandise imports generated substantial
speculative demand, particularly for consumer durables, resulting in an in-
crease rather than a decrease in merchandise imports.
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dealwith the situation: stringent im ort licencing. On November 24 the
existing licencing system was hurriedly altered, with a switch from a system
in which virtually everything was on to one in which the general rule
was a specific licence for everything v ith a very few exceptions placed on
OGL.
The new Open General Import Licet ce list published at the time allowed
for importation of only: (1) single copi.:s of books and periodicals addressed
to individuals and (2) non-merchandise articles —tradesamples, personal ef-
fects, and small gifts.38 All other imports required specific licences.
The licencing authorities then set out to consider the current import
needs. Due to the large stocks of imports built up in anticipation of licencing,
a highly restrictive policy could be and was followed over the first year of
licencing (1962). The overall objective was one of keeping imports to the
barest minimum possible. Initially this was pursued on an ad hoc basis. As
their capabilities to handle applications expanded, the authorities developed
procedures for handling various categories and invited applications for spe-
cific licences in each category. Beginning with manufacturers' materials and
then vehicles, equipment, building materials, textiles, chemicals, consumer
non-durables, and so on, dates and procedures for applications were an-
nounced. At the same time a few items were added to the OGL list to provide
for specific needs (education, sports, water works, agricultural feeds, and
seeds), for traditional border trade in livestock and food, for spare parts, and
temporarily for essential food items.
The hurried way in which licencing had been introduced and the ad hoc
nature of the procedures inevitably generated dissatisfaction with the working
of the system. Shortages of specific items, together with persistent rumors of
corruption in the licencing administration brought the situation to a head,
and in late 1962 a commission of enquiry was appointed. While it took over a
year to complete its work,39 the licencing authorities immediately attempted
to streamline the day-to-day administration of the system. They also turned
their attention to the development of a longer-run system containing the
following elements: (a) Expected foreign exchange available for specifically
licenced imports was estimated. (b) An import program was drawn up in
which available foreign exchange was provisionally allocated among various
categories of specifically licenced imports. (c) Importers were registered and
classified. Allocations among the categories of specifically licenced imports
were based initially on historical shares, with the shares of "non-essentials"
38. A tabulation of annual OGL lists is available from the author on request.
39. The final report is contained in:Republic of Ghana, Report of Commission of
Enquiry into Alleged Irregularities and Maipractices in Connection with the Issue of
Import Licences, Accra, February 1964.
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(i.e.,items that in the licencing authorities' view could be reduced) scaled
down. Importers (but not licences) were of two general types: manufacturers Ii.
importing for own use, and importers buying for resale. Within each general
type importers were assessed on the basis of their historical shares, current it
size of their operations, payments of taxes, and employment. Licences were
then allocated to importers which were specific to that importer and specific t
inthe commodities that could be imported.40
Given the relatively small manufacturing sector, the licencing authorities ti
appeared to be able to develop a reasonably clear understanding of local
manufacturers' requirements for materials and spare parts, and attempted to
meet those requirements. The importers of goods for resale proved to be
more of a problem for the licencing authorities. A system involving grades for
importers was introduced, with grades ranging from A (large trading firms)
through D, based on historical shares of turnover, taxes paid, and employ-
ment. Within each grade (except A) firms were allocated approximately equal
amounts of foreign exchange. Very soon a fifth grade, E, had to be intro-
duced as the number of "importers" began to grow, arising from both new
entrants and a multiplication of old firms. Further, although resale of licences a
was prohibited, it was impossible to deal with petty instances of the equiva-
lent resale of goods. A common device was for a small recipient of a licence
to arrange for a larger experienced firm to handle all aspects of the importa-
tion on behalf of the smaller importer —withprofits, of course, split between
them.
Du1i'.g the early part of the second year of licencing (1963) administration
of the system appeared to work reasonably smoothly. Stocks depleted during
the previous year were gradually rebuilt, and the OGL list was adjusted to
meet apparent difficulties and Some attempt was also
made to limit imports of goods in which import-substitution appeared possi-
ble. For example, it was announced in October 1963 that imports of certain
kinds of footwear, matches, toilet paper, nails, and plastic utensils were pro-
hibited.41
The licencing authority was organized internally with a system of control
and records designed to permit efficient handling of applications and at the
same time prevent irregularities in the granting of licences. The set of records
permitted easy reference to the details concerning an applicant, and the sys-
tem of controls involved a four-stage procedure in which (1) the allocation
40. Trading in licences and resale of manufacturers' materials were prohibited. Undoubt-
edly some trading and resale did take place, but a large organized continuing market
for licences and materials never developed.
41. See: Commercialand Industrial Bulletin, 4October, 1963. In practice, however,
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was decided, (2) the allocation approved, (3) the licence issued, and (4) the
licence checked against the approved allocation and recorded. In preparation
for the 1964 licence year, the procedures outlined above were well underway
in the final quarter of 1963.
In late 1963, however, a new Minister of Trade was appointed, Mr. A.Y.K.
Djin. He quickly saw the potentialities for corruption inherent in a restrictive
licencing system. As the investigative commision appointed after the over-
throw of the Nkrumah regime found:
..He assumed direct responsibility for the issue of import licences, and no such
licences could be issued without his express direction...: licences were issued solely at
his discretion, capriciously exercised with the consequent development of a crisis in
the import trade and attendant trade malpractices... [He] also embarked on irregular-
ities in the issue of licences and fraudulently exploited the situation created by
himself for his own benefit, to the advantage of members of his family and personal
friends... 42
TheCommission also found instances of "fraudulent exploitation, corruption
and malpractices."43 For example, a small trading firm under Mr. Djin's
direction had received a licence valued at £G 35,000 for 1963, but in 1965
was awarded a licence worth over £G Apparently to facilitate the
manipulation of the licencing system, the expanded OGL list of 1963 was
restricted in 1964. The rest of the government bureaucracy viewed these
developments with disfavor. The careful administrative procedures that had
been designed to meet the apparent national needs and to minimize capri-
cious discrimination among importers was frequently set aside in favor of Mr.
Dim and his associates.
In the first half of 1965 a number of steps were taken in an attempt to
reverse the situation created by Mr. Djin. President Nkrumah replaced Mr.
Djin by Mr. Kwesi Armah as Minister of Foreign Trade and appointed a
further commission of enquiry, which quickly did its work.45 In addition, a
foreign-exchange budget was published for the first time. The only significant
result of these moves was a more systematic form of corruption. Mr. Armah,
rather than restricting himself to profiting on some licences, proceeded to
42. Republic of Ghana, White Paper on the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into
Alleged Irregularities and Malpractices in Connection with the Grant of Import
Licences, W.P. No. 4/67, Accra, 1967, p. 3.
43. Ibid.,p.3.
44. Ibid.,p.3.
45. Republic of Ghana, Office of the President, Report of the Commission of Enquiry
into Trade Maipracrices in Ghana, Accra, January 1966.
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develop a system that would permit him to share in the profit on all licences.
As the post-Nkrumah commission reported: N
He [Mr. Armahi introduced the system whereby at! applications for import licences
hadto be addressed tohun personally under registered cover and he alone was
responsible for processing the said applications... [1] here was open corruption and
malpractices in the matter of grant of import licences during this period. Import
licences were issued on the basis of a commission corruptly demanded and payable
by importers on the face value of the import licences issued. The commission was
fixed at 10%, but was in special cases reduced to 7'/2or5%46
Theresult was that licences were refused for essential commodities in short
supply while at the same time Armah "was issuing huge licences to importers
for non-essential goods."47 Again the stated priorities for rationing foreign
exchange were being thwarted.
The restriction of the OGL list begun by Mr. Djin was continued. At the
end of July 1965 a new OGL list was announced which apparently limited
OGL to about the level prevailing when licencing was first introduced in late
1961. And in October 1965 OGL was further restricted in significance with
the introduction of a requirement that OGL importers had to apply to Ex-
change Control before entering into a contract.48 This system continued
until the ouster of President Nkrumah in late February 1966.
(d) Bilateral trade pacts
The licencing system during 1962 and part of 1963 was not well designed
to induce importers to purchase from bilateral-pact countries. Licences were
valid for importation of the specified items from any country.49 While offi-
cial entities were redirecting their purchases, for private importers the only
apparent advantage that might be achieved by purchasing from trade-pact
countries revolved around payment in local currency to the bilateral account
in the Bank of Ghana and the consequent reduction in problems associated
with arranging payment to suppliers. This was seldom enough to offset the
traditional ties with West European and U.S. suppliers. The result of this
situation was a substantial undersubscribing of the bilateral accounts in 1962,
yielding a positive net balance in bilateral clearing accounts of nearly
6 million (see Table 11-5). This phenomenon and its meaning were not unno-
46. White Paper. 1967, op.cit., p.4.
47. Ibid.,p.5.
48. Commercialand Industrial Bulletin, 1October, 1965.
49. See, for example, invitation for applications for specific import licences, Commer-
cialand Industrial Bulletin,26October, 1962: "Items originating in any country
except [South Africa and the Portuguese monetary area] ,"p.847.r
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S. TABLE11-5
Net balances on clearing accounts,1961 through 1969 at year end (in millions of new
cedis).
Year Net balance Change over year
1961 0.5
1962 6.0 +5.4







Source:Bank of Ghana, Report of the Board for the Financial Year Ended 30 June,
1965 (for 1961—1963); 1968 (for 1964—1967); 1970 (for 1968—1969).
ticed,5° and in 1963 specific licences distinguished between trade-pact
sources and other areas. In addition imports of certain goods (8 commodities)
could be obtained only from those countries, and 20 percent of other speci-
fied imports (28 commodities) were to come from trade-pact countries. For
1964 the redirection of licences to bilateral trade-pact countries was strength-
ened. A special exchange allocation was provided, and a list of 35commodi-
ties developed which permitted purchases only in bilateral-pact countries.
Further, in order to discriminate among the various bilateral partners the
• system of sirnpiy distinguishing between bilateral partners as a group and all
others was abandoned in favor of specifying the bilateral partner country
from which the licenced commodity had to be imported.
These moves succeeded in turning the balance around, so that at the end
of 1964 there was a small negative balance, and by the end of 1965 Ghana
had succeeded in becoming a net borrower to the extent of over 36 mil-
lion. Moreover, the methods employed in 1964 succeeded in redirecting im-
ports from some large negative-balance countries to countries with positive
balances. This reduced absolutely the large negative balances with the Peo-
ples' Republic of China (from 2.2 million to — Imillion)and the
negative balance with Mali (from — 1 .0 million to —0.4 million). At
the same time the large positive balance with the USSR was substantially
50. The Economic Survey, published by the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), for
1962, p. 112, noted that "this [credit balance] amounted to the almost ridiculous
position of Ghana offering interest-free loans to certain industrialized countries."
And The Economic Survey for 1963 noted problems with delivery dates and
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reduced (from 4 million to 2.6 million).51 The discrimination be-
tween bilateral-pact countries and others, as well as among bilateral-pact
countries, continued until well after the coup.52
(e) Consequences of the system under the Nkrumah goveTnment
The tight application of quantitative' restrictions during the last four years
of the Nkrumah government (1962 through 1965) failed to achieve what
must be regarded as its primary objective —reducingthe substantial negative
balance of payments on goods and services. Although highly variable, the net
balance of payments on goods and services remained strongly negative over
the period (see Table A-3a). On the import side, the share from bilateral
trade-pact countries had increased by over ten percentage points (see Table
A-4b). Shares of imports by end-use had been redistributed away from con-
sumer goods and to increases in the shares of materials and capital equipment
(see Table A-4a). On the export side, the overall dependence on staple pri-
mary exports continued, with commodity concentration rising slightly. New
markets, particularly for cocoa, were opened in the trade-pact countries,
resulting in a minor reduction in geographic concentration.53 It did, however,
have the advantage of permitting Ghana to expand the output of cocoa
without seriously weakening the price obtained. Financing of the current
account deficit was done largely via contracting external debt. While small
amounts of private foreign capital were received over the period and reserves
were further depleted, the great bulk of the funds which permitted the large
current deficits were obtained by entering into debt. By the time of the coup
in. February 1966, the external debt totalled 805.3 million, of which only
20 percent was in the form of long-term loans. The remainder was made up in
large part by suppliers' credits (57.9percent),54arrears of current payment
(10.6 percent), and bank loans (6.5 percent) (Table 11-6). This legacy was to
create serious problems for subsequent governments.
The system was also generating considerable internal dissatisfaction. Again
a commission of enquiry was appointed (April 1965), although on this occa-
sion the focus was more broadly defined to include a variety of trade "mal-
51. See Bank of Ghana, Report of the Board for the Financial Year Ended 30 June.
1965.
52. Unfortunately no careful assessment of the relative benefits and costs of the trade-
pact experience has yet been published.
53. See IC. Leith, "Export Concentration and Instability: The Case of Ghana," op. cit,;
and IC. Leith, "The Competitive Performance of Ghanaian Exports in the Nkrumah
Period," Ghana Social Sciences Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1, May 1971.
54. The unfortunate experience Ghana had with suppliers' credits is described in L.E.
Grayson, "The Role of Suppliers' Credits in the Industrialization of Ghana," Eco-
nomic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 21, No.3, April 1973.Quant ((afire Restrictions
TABLE 11-6
External debt (other than private) as of February 23, 1966 (in millions of new cedis,
postdevaluation)
Type Value Percent
Long-term loans 161.4 20.0
Suppliers' credit 466.1 57.9
Arrears 85.3 10.6




Source:Republic of Ghana, Statement by E.N. Omaboe, Commissioner for Economic
Affairs, Developments in the Ghanaian Economy between 1960 and 1968,
Ghana Publishing Corporation, Accra, undated (published for the election
campaign period in mid-1969).
practices," such as the internal distribution system. The report,55 presented
shortly before Nkrumah's overthrow, found a variety of cases in which short-
ages of imports created difficulties. The State Paints Corporation closed be-
tween May and July 1965. Agricultural inputs (fertilizers and machetes) were
frequently in short supply. A factory under construction was unnecessarily
delayed because of import delays. And considerable corruption was ex-
posed.56
Criticism was not confined to the official enquiry. The annual Economic
Surveys issued by the Central Bureau of Statistics contained strong indict-
ments, couched in diplomatic language, of the undesirable consequences of
inadequate supplies of raw materials and of shortages of essential food
items.57 Similarly, the Planning Commission expressed open concern about
the consequences of spare parts and raw material shortages.58 Further, an
unpublished study cited by Killick estimated that in 1964 manufacturing
capacity utilization was at about 60 percent of single-shift capacity.59
.55. Republic of Ghana, Office of the President, Report of the Commission of Enquiry
into Trade Maipractices in Ghana, op. cit.
56. For a review of the Commission's report, emphasizing the internal trading aspects,
see Rowena M. Lawson, "Inflation in the Consumer Market in Ghana: Report of the
Commission of Enquiry into Trade Malpractices in Ghana," Economic Bulletin of
Ghana, No. 1, 1966, pp. 36-5 1.
57. SeeCBS,Economic Survey, 1964, p. 77;1965,p. 75.
58. Office of the Planning Commission, Annual Plan for 1965, Accra, 1965.
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By 1965, faced with growing criticism of the system at home, the govern- c
mentturned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International ti
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), but received little more
than affirmation of the apparent. As the commentator in the Economic Sur-
vey for 1965 noted:
ti
The Fund Mission's Report confirmed what has been obvious to most observers all a along. The Report stated that "the Ghana economy is severely overstrained, the
balance of payments is in serious deficit, and the country's foreign exchange reserves g
are at a precariously low level. Foreign debt repayments are increasing, putting added
pressure on the balance of payments."60 d
C
Ina similar vein, the response of the IBRD called for strong medicine.
a
The World Bank Mission recommended "a restoration of the balance between govern-
ment revenue and expenditure" stating that "such action would hopefully be re- C
gardedby all sectors of the world financial community as constituting a determined
effort on your part and deserving of their assistance in complementing the efforts of
your government."61
The situation was serious. Heavy borrowing by Nkrumah plus a further
depletion of foreign-exchange reserves had been used to finance the import
binge of 1965. Predictably, these sources were quickly drying up. With a
short- and medium-term external debt totalling645 million (Table 11-6) —
nearlytwo times annual export earnings —andreserves of only26 million
(Table A-3b), Ghana's credit was nearly exhausted. The prospect for 1966
was not good, for even with a reliance on normal export earnings, current
account expenditures would have to be cut by about 35 percent from the
1965 level if further borrowing and reserve depletion were to be avoided. In
itself this was a very serious situation. Compounding the difficulties was a
glut on the cocoa market, and total merchandise export earnings were falling.
The 1966 returns eventually showed a 13 percent decline in merchandise
exports from 1965 to 1966. A drastic cutback of imports, and hence real
income, was required. Licencing was again tightened.
(1) Stabilization
The difficulties experienced in the economic sphere contributed in no
small way to the political events of early 1966. February 24, 1966 marked a
major change in the political, social and economic life of Ghana. A military
coup replaced the regime of President Nkrumah with a National Liberation
60.EconomicSurvey, 1965, p. 50.
61.Ibid., p. 51.
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• Council (NLC). The new government set itself the task of national reconstruc-
al tion which, in the economic field, involved an austerity or "stabilization"
re program designed to bring both the foreign and government sector accounts
r- into balance again.
In dealing with the foreign sector, the NLC government severely restricted
the overall level of foreign exchange available for imports and attempted to
dl allocate foreign exchange among competing demands on a basis that it re-
ie garded as systematic and rational. The former was relatively easily accom-
pushed once the licencing system was reorganized to resemblethe system
developed in the earlier years. The latter objective, faced with the inevitable
conflict among competing "rational" uses of a rationed item, together with
the delays inherent in a system designed to prevent abuse, was not as readily
achieved.
The system that emerged during 1966 emphasized fair and open treatment
of applicants while at the same time attempting to meet the objective of
d mobilizing domestic resources and ensuring an adequate and cheap supply of
essential commodities for consumers.
The overall foreign-exchange budget was struck by the Bank of Ghana, and
in turn allocations were made to the various ministries responsible for specific
illocations of licenses:
Ministry of Trade -—commercialimports,
Ministry of Industries —.importsfor private industrial use,
State Enterprises Secretariat —stateindustrial enterprises,
Ministry of Economic Affairs —governmentimports.
The final issuance of licences remained with the Ministry of Trade, and the
• resulting allocations were published in the Commercial and Industrial Bulletin
for all to see.62 Of major interest and importance are the procedures adopted
for private commercial and for private industrial imports.
The system of grading commercial importers established in the early days
of import licencing was retained. However, a complete revision of the register
of commercial importers was undertaken. Grades were assigned according to
past volume.63 Importers with 2 million annual volume over the period
1961 to 1965 were assigned the top grade. The remaining grades ranged from
importers with an annual volume of 100,000 to those with 20,000
62. The allocations were published in such a way, however, that it is impossible to
distinguish among allocations for commercial, industrial or governmental use.
63. This,of course, tended to perpetuate inequities that had developed over the years,
only the extreme cases that were the subject of the official post-coup
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volume. Within each grade commercial importers were assigned approximate-
ly equal foreign-exchange allocations. The objective in this approach was to
"obtain goods on competitive terms and at reasonable prices to the con-
sumers,'64 hence the reliance on larger firms with proven trade and financial
contacts and facilities to ensure that the country had adequate supplies of
essential commodities.
Private industries' requirements for imported materials new equipment and
spare parts were assessed by the Ministry of Industries. Again, a system of
various categories was employed which reflected the conflicting objectives of
protection of the consumer (hence a high priority given to imports for use by
producers of essential consumer goods), of export promotion (with conse-
quent high priority for export industries), and of import-substitution (also a
high-priority category). From the given allocation of foreign exchange as-
signed it, the Ministry of Industries first divided the available foreign ex-
change among the categories and then attempted to make pro rata allocations
among firms within a category based approximately on previous market
shares but taking into account their assessment of the firms' "performance"
in such things as employment, taxes paid, and what was called general effi-
ciency of operation. While there is no evidence of corruption during this
period, the bureaucrats' assessment of performance inevitably resulted in
some arbitrary allocations.
The import-licence system, since it had virtual life and death powers over
most industries, came to be used as an industrial licencing system as well. The
Ministry of Industries saw a conflict between the need for competition among
domestic producers and the wasteful expenditure involved in duplicating
underutilized domestic facilities, but generally resolved it during the NLC
period in favor of "rationalization" of industries and against new entrants.
The post-coup review of the licencing machinery also brought an attempt
toalleviate the very serious shortages that had developed in the later
Nkrumah era and which had resulted in empty shops, as well as idle factories
due to the lack of imports. The OGL list for 1967 was expanded a little over
that of 1965 and 1966, and the administrative system was designed to permit
the issuance of licences in advance of the year for which they would be valid
—incontrast with the 1964 and 1965 experience of licences often being
issued very late in the year for which they were valid. A schedule for submis-
sion of applications for 1967 licences was set up, with applications for essen-
tials (flour, sugar, rice, milk, butter, tinned fish and meat, and other meat)
being called for in August, spare parts and raw materials in September, etc..
with the objective of having licences for virtually all foreseeable imports
64. commercial and Industrial Bulletin, 7 October, 1966, p. 778.
-.j.Quantitative Restrictions 33
issued before the beginning of the calendar year in which-they would be usea.
In practice, however, it was difficult to achieve this, for there was typically
some delay in striking the overall foreign-exchange budget and, in turn, delay
in sifting through the multi-staged allocational process which preceded the
specific firm allocations.
The system as it emerged and was applied in 1967 was substantially more
open and less corrupt than the chaotic state of affairs which had prevailed in
f 1964 and 1965. Within the tight foreign-exchange budget, the licencing
If authorities did attempt to allocate licences in a way that reflected their
perception of national needs and, subject to this constraint, avoided serious
discrimination between individuals. It does not follow, however, that the
system was necessarily any less arbitrary than in the late Nkrumah period.
(g) Liberalization
The worst abuses of the late Nkrumah period apparently had been re-
moved. Yet the interventionist approach to allocation remained, and this too
was being called into question. A growing belief developed among policy-
• makers that import licencing was not a long-run solution to the Ghanaian
foreign-exchange problem.65 Pressure to pursue a liberalization of licencing
was also brought to bear on the government from both outside the country
by bilateral donors and international agencies, and by internal dissatisfaction
with licencing. As a consequence, a tentative commitment to long-range liber-
alization developed.
The first major steps toward a liberalized trade and payments regime were
taken in the third quarter of 1967. A substantial devaluation of nearly 43
percent was introduced in July, together with some import duty and export
tax reductions. Accompanying the devaluation was an announcement of an
expanded OGL list. The net result was that 3 percent of all imports came
under OGL for calendar year 1967, and over 18 percent of all imports in
1968.66 Progress was also made in mopping up the massive foreign-exchange
payments arrears that had accumulated prior to the coup (Table 11-6 above),
so that by the end of 1967 foreign-exchange cover had been provided or
special arrangements had been made for virtually all arrears that had been
pending in early 1966.
The import-liberalization process is considered in more detail below (Chap-
ter V). In terms of the present narrative, the important point to note is that
the process of import liberalization was a gradual one in which the licencing
system was retained intact, albeit somewhat shrunken in magnitude. While by
65. The evident dissatisfaction in official circlesis illustrated by the sniping at the
system during the late Nkrumah period cited in article (e) above.
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the end of 1970 the OGL system had expanded to cover 60 percent of all
imports and a much higher proportion of essential consumer and producer
goods, the system governing import licencing remained much the same as the
system that had developed in the early years. The foreign-exchange budget
was struck, an import program drawn up taking into account recent shares of
imports by end-use plus expected OGL imports, and a block of foreign ex-
change assigned to each of the Trade and Industries divisions for allocation to
commercia' and industrial importers respectively.67
Commercial imports subject to specific licencing, which now constituted
nearly all the specifically licenced imports, were allocated by the Trade divi-
sion first among 56 classes of goods and second among registered importers.
The detail of the commodity classification varied from the SITC three-digit to e
the six-digit level. Some items, such as fuels and lubricants and essential d
consumer goods not yet assigned to the OGL list, would be automatically a
allocated sufficient foreign exchange to meet expected demand, while the ç
remaining foreign exchange was divided among the residual items. The alloca-
tion to firms continued to be based on the grading system with the top-grade
firms handling about 60 percent and virtually the entire range of licenced a
commercial imports.68 It was on these firms that the government continued
to rely to keep imports flowing smoothly. A major limit on the share of
licences going to grade-A firms appears to have been the extent of their
financial capacity to handle imports. In the lower grades firms were allocated
licences for only those few commodities in which they specialized. Typically,
all firms within a grade would receive about equal allocations, although some
attempt was made to distinguish among the medium-sized firms on the basis
of their overall turnover, local commodity sales, employment and tax pay-
ments. However, to minimize suspicion of favoritism on their part, the
licencing authorities clearly preferred to assign a flat rate to each importer
within a grade and departed from that only when there was clear evidence of
superior "performance," such as employment.
While the administrative apparatus remained essentially unchanged in its
procedures and intent from the original system developed in the early part of
the decade, a number of other elements of the system had changed. First,
there was now a continuing process of foreign-exchange budgeting, involving
67. Commercial imports covered nondurable consumer goods, durable consumer goods,
fuels and lubricants. Industrial imports covered nondurable producers' goods, dura-
ble producers' goods. and producers' equipment.
68. Ghana National Trading Corporation, the large state-owned trading company con-
tinued to receive a somewhat larger share than the other grade-A firms because of its
obligation to carry larger stocks and broader ranges of imported goods. However, it
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the preparation of forecast receipts and programmed imports. While attempts
r to develop a foreign-exchange budgeting system had begun inthe late
Nkrumah period, the budgets prepared for 1965 and 1966 were little more
than scraps of paper.69 Only after the coup was any serious attempt made to
f implement a foreign-exchange budget. Prompted by the need to present a
coherent case for aid to donor countries, foreign-exchange budgets were
drawn up and published beginning in However, even these attempts
were far from successful. Tony Killick has provided some interesting corn-
parisons of programmed and actual imports for the years 1968 and 1969.71
The budgets were regarded as targets, both for the level and the composition of
• foreign-exchange use. In both years, non-durable consumer goods imports
exceeded programmed imports by substantial margins, while actual pro-
ducers' materials imports fell short of the programmed values. And, in looking
• at specific items he found typically wide differences between actual and
programmed values. He concluded that "the import programmes were only
• very loosely implemented when it came to details and this and other factors
resulted in an actual detailed composition of imports that bore only the most
approximate relationship to the intentions of the planners."72 The allocation
of licences was not, apparently, closely geared to the target budgets.
Second, promotion of small Ghanaian businesses became one of the objec-
tives of a variety of government policy instruments, including the import-
licencing system. As early as October 1966, in the exercise of reviewing the
register of importers following the coup, special consideration was given to
small Ghanaian importers. Some 763 Ghanaian importers were initially struck
from the register because their volume fell below the 20,000 per annum
minimum required for the lowest grade, but they were quickly reinstated.73
Similarly, in the post-coup period the transfer of licences between firms and
between commodities remained illegal under the threat of fines and deregis.
tration. However, a licence once issued could now be returned for endorse-
ment to another importer, thus permitting small firms to import via a larger
firm with established buying and credit connections. The endoresment pro-
cedure, however, was open only to small Ghanaian firms. En other words, the
licencing system was also being used to promote the Ghanaianization of small
69. The 1965 central government budget contains the first published foreign-exchange
budget, and a similar document was prepared for 1966 (prior to the coup).
70. Republic of Ghana, Ghana's Economy and Aid Requirements in 1967, Accra, 1967.
Similar titles were used for the 1968 (Accra. 1968) and the January 1969—June
1970 documents (Accra, 1969).
71. "The Purposes and Consequences of Import Controls in Ghana," op. cit., Accra,
• 1972.
72. Ibid.. pp. 22-23.
73. See Commercial and Industrial Bulletin. 7 October, 1966.
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businesses, thus adding a further objective to an already overburdened instru- (
ment.
Third, as the OGL list expanded to include most producer materials and
equipment it became evident that import licencing could no longer be used as
an industrial licencing instrument. The Minister of Trade and Industries re- s
sponded with the Manufacturing Industries Act, which came into force in a
April 1971. The Act provided for licencing of new or expanding manufac- d
turing activities, and enabled the Minister to issue instructions and regulations
for any manufacturing industry "relating to the quality, quantity and prices
of products."74
Fourth, the extent to which the licencing system effectively discriminated (
betweenluxury "inessentials" and less luxurious "essential" commodities was
impaired by the liberalization of licence allocations. Licence categories were d
broadened and the number reduced to the point that in 1971 non-OGL e
commercial import licences were allocated among only 56 categories. Without
a corresponding adjustment of the tariff (which discriminates between com-
modities at a much finer level of detail) or of the sales tax system, the result
of these developments was a substantial increase in imports of more luxurious
consumer goods.
Finally, the rapid expansion of the OGL list from 1968 was not generally
used to reduce protection of domestic producers. On the contrary, accom-
panying the expanded OGL list, which emphasized liberalization of materials,
equipment and spare parts imports, was a list of restricted/prohibited imports
amounting to some 80 or more customs items. Without a corresponding
increase in excise tax rates (applicable to domestically produced goods only),
the net protection of many domestic producers was probably increased.75
While this approach represents an import-substitution orientation of the
licencing system, there is little evidence that it constituted a major justifica-
tion of licencing. Rather, given the existence of licencing, the development of
a restricted/prohibited list was primarily an ad hoc response to pressure by
domestic manufacturers already engaged in production.76
74. Manufacturing !ndustries Act, Act 356, 1971, paragraph 8.
75. Prior to 1965 individual announcements of restricted/prohibited items had been
made from time to time, but for 1966 a list published in October 1965 pulled
together previous prohibitions, including various kinds of textiles and footwear. A
similar list for 1967 consisted of 81 items. (See Commercial and Industrial Bulletin,
19 July, 1966.) Subsequent lists were all of approximately the same magnitude.
76. The theme of protection for import-substitution is taken up again in Chapter III.Aggregate Demand, Domestic Prices, and Trade 37
6Aggregate demand, domestic prices, and trade
We consider now a different set of instruments, those affecting aggregate
demand in the domestic economy. In contrast with the instruments discussed
so far, the aggregate instruments are not designed to single out particular
activities in the domestic economy, but rather to act on the total level of
domestic activity. This is not to say that given other policies the effects are
likely to be neutral between sectors. Rather, the focus is on the total balance
in the economy.
(a) Aggregate demand, and domestic prices
The process of achieving aggregate balance of national income and expen.
diture may be described as the way in which the economy moves towards the
equilibrium:
Y—C+I+X—M (11.3)
The variables in this well-known identity are net output (Y), consumption
expenditure (C), net investment expenditure (I'), exports (X) and imports
(M). They are all value flows of goods and services per period in current
prices.
In general, the potential supply of output depends on the productive
resources available to the economy. Expenditures on output are determined
by a great variety of factors, including the instruments of fiscal and monetary
policies. Unless there is a significant gap between actual and potential output,
the real level of output is unaffected by the magnitudes of the variables on
the right-hand side of equation (11.3). Hence the response to increased expen-
diture must involve some adjustment via an increase in imports and in the
price of domestic output or a reduction in the value of expenditure com-
ponents.
The nature of the adjustment depends largely on the country's trade and
payments system. If the system permits a free flow of trade and payments
without quantitative restrictions, then for a small country the domestic price
level of tradeables is linked directly with international prices of the same
goods. Under these circumstances aggregate demand pressure, ceteris paribus,
is vented largely on the external balance with increased imports and decreased
exports: the domestic price level of tradeables is given by international prices.
If, however, adjustment via the external balance is blocked by some mecha-
nism such as controls over imports, the link with international prices is cut.
Aggregate demand pressure is vented on the domestic price level to bring
about the adjustment, leaving an unsatisfied excess demand for imports. As
the domestic price level moves out of line with the international price level,38 EvOlution of the Restrictive System
theunsatisfied excess demand for imports is exacerbated and, to the extent
that export supply depends on relative prices, exports fall off.
Ghana has experienced both of these types of adjustments to aggregate
demand pressure.77 In 1959, responding to the desire to speed development, w
the government incurred a substantial deficit (see Table A-5), creating an
excess of total expenditure over output. With a fixed exchange rate and a w
relatively free system of international trade and payments, the adjustment
came about largely in the form of increased imports of goods and services,
which jumped by more that one-third in 1959. The excess demand for real
resources in general was thus turned into a demand for foreign goods and
services. This demand was met via a current account deficit, which was
accomodated by drawing on foreign-exchange reserves and external capital
account borrowing, largely on the part of the government. At this stage, then,
the pressure was largely vented on the external balance and not on domestic
prices.
The capital account balance turned strongly negative in 1961, while the u
currentaccount balance moved into an even larger deficit position. In that
year reserves dropped from297 million to 147 million. Such a reserve
loss was clearly not sustainable. At some point the home excess demand for
real resources at the fixed exchange rate would be resisted by foreigners. In
the absence of any action by the home government, the foreigners' response
would ultimately have been to charge a higher price for foreign exchange,
either directly by not accepting the official exchange rate, or indirectly ad-
justing the prices of tradeables and refusing credit on capital account. The
result for domestic residents would have been a movement up along the
domestic excess demand curve for foreign exchange.
For the home government, if it were to avoid allowing the foreigners to
make the adjustment for them —andfailing a change in the official exchange S
rate —somedevice had to be found to close the deficit. The options in.
cluded: (a) a reduction in the overall excess demand for resources in general
and hence for external resources in particular; (b) an increase in the effective
domestic price for foreign exchange; or (c) a system of non-price rationing of
foreign exchange. Initially, a combination of all three was chosen. One recalls
from section 3 above that in 1961 an attempt was made to institute deflation-
ary policies, taxes on imports were increased, and the non-price rationing of
foreign exchange via exchange control and import licencing were drastically
tightened.
77. We are not here considering the implementation of fiscal and monetary policies. The
reader is referred to W. Birmingham eta!.,op.cit., andto N. Ahmad, op.cit., for
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By choosing to employ non-price rationing as one of the devices to close
the external deficit, the policymakers instituted an important change that was
not perhaps fully understood at the time. Pressure of domestic excess demand
would now be vented largely on the domestic price level, permitting it to get
out of line with international prices. Failure to control aggregate demand
would now show up as higher domestic prices rather than as a loss of reserves.
TABLE 11-7
Price deflators of national accounts components(1960 =100).
Year GDP minus exports









1956 93.23 93.58 96.73 91.97
1957 97.50 89.45 97.69 92.32
1958 97.22 123.85 96.73 101.11




1961 88.41 101.24 103.20
1962 119.60 74.07 95.74 105.40
1963 127.15 75.97 92.95 112.48
1964 134.38 91.14 104.04 123.70
1965 174.29 75.45 107.43 144.60
1966 195.04 71.57 102.89 161.10
1967 179.05 92.01 128.76 156.93
1968 197.21 128.12 141.04 179.90
1969 208.43 153.43 147.02 195.63
Sources:1.Current prices: GDP
1956 through 1959,EconomicSurvey, 1967;
1960 through 1962,Economic Survey, 1968;
1963 through 1969,EconomicSurvey, 1969.
Exports of goods and non-factor services
1956 through 1959,Economic Survey, 1967;
1961,EconomicSurvey, 1.968;
1960, 1962 through 1969,Economic Survey, 1969.
2.Constant prices:GD?
1959 through 1969,Economic Survey, 1967 and 1969;
1956 through 1958, Birmingham eta!., The Economy of Ghana, Vol.1,
p. 50.
Exports of goods and non-factor services
1956 through 1958, Birmingham et a!., The Economy of Ghana, Vol. I,
p. 50.
1959,Economic Survey, 1967;
1961, Economic Survey, 1968;
1960, 1962 through 1969,Economic Survey, 1969.
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In the absenée of compensatory increases in the nominal effective exchange
rates facing exporters and importers, the prices of tradeables relative to non-
tradeables would become cheaper and cheaper. This, in fact, is what did hap-
pen (from 1960 onwards). Looking at the domestic component of the GDP
deflator (GDP—X), we find that by 1966 it had reached an index of 195,
compared with an f.o.b. export index of 75, and a c.i.f.-plus-duty import
index of 102 (Table II-?, 1960 =100).
There was little explicit recognition of the problems created by this ap-
proach for either exports or imports. With the rising domestic price level,
offsetting action on both the export and import sides was required to main-
tain relative prices atpre-1960 situation. When such action was either not
forthcoming (exports) or inadequate (imports), the already serious aggregate
imbalance on external account was exacerbated by increasingly inappropriate
relative prices in the domestic economy. The remainder of this section is thus
devoted to a discussion of the consequences of aggregate imbalance and
domestic price inflation for exports and imports. Our discussion is confined
to the pre-devaluation period, as the response to a major shock such as the
1967 devaluation may well be different. These latter issues are taken up in
Chapter V below. For an overview of major trends of imports, non-cocoa and
cocoa exports, together with the corresponding price-level-deflated effective
exchange rates, see Chart 11-2.
(b) Exports
We consider first non-cocoa exports, which typically account for 35 to 40
percent of total merchandise export earnings. We have computed the price-
level-deflated effective exchange rate facing these exports (Table 11-8). It is
clear that the nominal effective exchange rate facing non-cocoa exports was
not kept in line with the domestic price level.78 At the same time there was
the continuous79 decline in non-cocoa exports valued in constant prices
detailed in Table 11-9. These data, together with the price-level-deflated effec-
tive exchange rate series from Table 11-8, permit us to examine explicitly the
response of non-cocoa exports to the relative price facing them. To do so, we
estimated the equation:
ln =cs+ f3in + Ut (11.4)
78. A minor attempt was made to introduce an export incentive scheme for manufac-
tured goods. It was announced that, effective January 1, 1966, exporters of manu-
factured commodities woufd be provided with additional import licences. This
scheme was abolished shortly after the coup of February 1966. See IMF, Annual
Report on Exchange Restrictions, 1966 and 1967.
79. Prior to 1961 there had been a continuous rise, averaging about 7.0 percent per
annum (compound) over the period 1955 through 1960.'I
Aggregate Demand, Domestic Prices, and Trade 41
where =thevalue of non-cocoa domestic exports in constant 1968—1969
prides, millions of N& from Table 11-9, and EERX/Pthe price-level-deflated
effective exchange rate facing non-cocoa exports, N47$ from Table 11-8. The
results, using ordinary least squares, for t196 1—1962 through 1966—1967
PhasesGhanaion experience
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TABLE 11-8
Price-level-deflated effective exchange rates facing imports
dollar in constant 1960 prices)
Sources: Computed from effective
deflator of Table 11-7.




D.W. =1.91,t-values in parentheses.
Even this limited number of observations permits us to see that there was
indeed a close relationship. The estimated equation explains over 90 percent
of the variance. The coefficient for the price-level-deflated effective exchange
rate, significant at the 0.005 level, shows the elasticity to be sufficiently large
to merit attention: the response to a 10 percent decline in the price-level-
deflated effective exchange rate was a 4.36 percent decline in non-cocoa
export earnings valued in constant prices. 80 Clearly, the continuing neglect of
80. A regression of current non-cocoa exports on current price-level-deflated effective
exchange rate yielded a lower elasticity and a lower R2. A regression on the price-
level-deflated effective exchange rate lagged one year also had a lower R2, but a
slightly higher elasticity. We have deliberately excluded the pre-1961 period from
our regression because we are concerned about the response within the context of
the control system.
and exports (new cedis per
Year For imports For non-cocoa exports For cocoa exports
1955 0.8888 0.7486 0.4194
1956 0,8912 0.7477 0.6602
1957 0.8798 0.7372 0.4958
1958 0.8229 0.6882 0.3529
1959 0.8232 0.7009 0.4490
1960 0.8359 0.7007 0.5737
1961 0.8457 0.6791 0.4172
1962 0.8653 0.6679 0.6503
1963 0.8169 0.6254 0.4907
1964 0.7516 0.5693 0.5948
1965 0.7307 0.4884 0.2259
1966 0.6893 0.4386 0.2634
1967A 0.6910 0.4512 0.3279
1967B 0.9590 , 0.6449 0.4685
1968 0.7747 0.5636 0.3366
1969 0.6909 0.5188 0.2712
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TABLE 11-9









1962 103.6 1961/62 100.2
1963 91.8 1962/63 97.6
1964 99.8 1963/64 99.7
1965 94.3 1064/65 96.5
1966 83.3 1965/66 88.8
1967 80.4 1966/67 81.6
1968 89.5 1967/68 86.1
1969 88.0 1968/69 85,3
1970 90.6 1969/70 87.4
Notes:The data consist of all the traditional non-cocoa exports including timber,
gold, bauxite, manganese. and diamonds, plus a number of minor exports, but
exclude Valco aluminum exports. Some few minor items, such as lime juice,
amounting to about 10 percent of non-cocoa exports, are not included be-
cause of incomplete quantity data.
Source: Computed by J.J. Stern, mimeograph, Accra, March 1972.
the relative price facing this large segment of exports resulted in a serious
deterioration of export earnings.
Cocoa exports are more complex to explain. They have long provided the
major share of Ghana's foreign-exchange revenues. Since the mid-1950's
cocoa has accounted for about 60 percent of merchandise export receipts and
has been a major source of stability in those receipts.81 However, because of
Ghana's major position in the world cocoa market and because of the long
gestation period for new plantings, the policy options for cocoa are consider-
ably more complex.
Ghana's substantial share of the world output has a number of implica-
tions. Ghana cannot take the world price as given: she has a significant effect
on it, and hence the cocoa export tax is intended to move the price in
Ghana's favor. Recent econometric estimates suggest that the demand elastic-
ity facing Ghana is (absolutely) greater than minus-one in the long run. For
example, the work by Blomqvist and Haessel, using a distributed lag model,
suggests that the long-run demand elasticity facing Ghana is on the order of
_1.4.82 Thus along-run expansion of output would increase Ghana's revenue
81. See iC. Leith, "Export Concentration and Instability: 'The case of Ghana,"op. cit.
82. AG. Blomqvist and Walter Haessel, "The Price Elasticity of Demand for Ghana's
Cocoa," Economic Bulletin of Ghana, Second Series, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1972. The esti-
mate of —1.4 is based on a market share of 30 percent.I
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from cocoa exports. However, in the shorter run the demand elasticity facing
Ghana is somewhat less (absolutely) than —1; consequently, a sudden expan-
sion of quantity sold would lead to a decline in revenue. This is a problem,
particularly in bumper crop years, as was the case in 1965; while the imme-
diate price decline is ameliorated by purchaser stock piling, prices are de-
pressed in subsequent years until the excess inventories are worked off.
Several factors enter into the supply side. Since the late 1930's the prices
paid to producers have been set by the Cocoa Marketing Board, which also
has legal monopsony powers. This price is usually set and held for a year or
more at a time, but has historically moved in response to the broad trends of
the world cocoa price.83 Estimates of the thort-run response to the real
producer price have yielded elasticities of the order of + 0.15 to + 0.20. 84
These represent the response of harvesting and maintenance and do not take
into account the effect of additional planting. The gestation period to full
bearing for cocoa trees is currently 7 or 8 years, and hence the long-run
response involves adjustment of the stock of trees. The estimates of long-run
price elasticity of supply range from + 0.71 to about 1.0.85 The long-run
response relationship, however, is further complicated by the fact that there
is a minimum real producer price below which no new plantings take place.
Other factors also have major effects on supply. In the short run, excessive
rainfall and humidity during the late maturing stage of the pods can damage
the crop, while later rainfall builds up more moisture reserve to carry the
growth through the harmattan (dry season). In the longer run, the capacity is
favorably affected by insecticide use, which keeps young trees healthy.86
A further complicating element in the cocoa policy determination is the
implicit conflict among the producer interests, the government revenue in-
terests, and perhaps the national welfare interest. Thus, given the elasticities
cited above, an increase in the real producer price would eventually increase
Ghana's export revenues. However, such a producer price increase would raise
producer incomes more than the increased export revenues, and would in-
83. See P. Ady, "Supply Functions in Tropical Agriculture," Bulletin of the Oxford
Institute of Statistics, Vol. 30, No. 2, May 1968, Chart 2, P. 165.
84. See M.J. Bateman, "Supply Relations for Perennial Crops in Less Developed Areas,"
in C.R. Wharton, ed., Subsistence Agriculture and Economic Development, Aldine,
Chicago, 1969, p. 251; and Bateman's more recent unpublished work on Ghanaian
cocoa: "Cocoa Study," in IBRD, Economic Report, Vol. IV, mimeograph, Washing-
ton, D.C., March 1972.
85. See Bateman, "Supply Relations for Perennial Crops in Less Developed Areas," op.
cit.
86. Bateman, in his "Cocoa Study," op. cit., estimates that about one-third of the
substantial increase in capacity between the 1950's and the 1960's was due to
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crease the Cocoa Marketing Board's handling cost to the extent that output
would expand, with the result that the residual for the government would be
reduced. 87
Inthe circumstances, beyond a general statement that an optimum tariff
should be employed, the appropriate first-best set of policies for cocoa is not
obvious. And because it is seldom possible to distinguish which distortions
must be taken as given, even a second-best optimum may not be possible to
specify. We have no unique contribution to make in this regard. Rather, we
are interested in the extent, if any, to which the system of the 1960's altered
the relative attractiveness of cocoa exporting vis-h-vis other activities in the
economy.
A simple summary indicator of the relative attractiveness of cocoa export-
ing is the price.level-deflated effective exchange rate (Table 11.8). From the
mid-1950's through 1964 a relatively constant level was maintained, with
fluctuations around a rate somewhere above 0.50 per dollar. However, a
distinct break occurred in 1965. The domestic inflation permitted by the
exchange control system resulted in a drastic drop in the price-level-deflated
effective exchange rate facing cocoa exports. Some recovery followed in 1966
and early 1967, but the level was nevertheless substantially below the average
of previous years. The emergence of domestic inflation, together with the low
nominal fixed producer prices, thus led to a relative decline in the attractive-
ness of growing cocoa for export.
This pattern, given the approximately unitary long-run supply elasticity
•cited above, resulted in a withdrawal of resources from the cocoa sector. In
1964/65 new plantings ceased, and have apparently not been resumed since.
For the long run this suggests a potentially serious stagnation of cocoa export
earnings -
(c)Imports
On the import side a limited policy response to rising relative domestic
prices was attempted. In an effort to mop upexcess demand spilling over
on imports during the first half of the 1960's, higher taxes on imports were
imposed, with an increase in the effective exchange rates facing imports of
almost 33 percent by 1966 over 1960 (see Table Il-I). This, however, was not
nearly enough to keep the relative price of imports in line with the domestic
87. For example, if the demand elasticity were —1.4 and the producer supply elasticity
were 1.0, a 10 percent increase in producer price would result in 10 percent addi-
tional output, a fall in the export price of about 7 percent, and a rise in export
receipts by about 2.3 percent. For the absolute size of the residual between export
receipts and producer payments to inzease (rathes than decrease) in these circum-
the producers' share would have to be less than 2.3 percent/21 percent11
percent of export receipts.I
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price level: the domestic component of the GDP deflator rose by about 95
percent in the same period (Table 11-7).
Instead, the government assumed that licencing could be used to contain
imports. Yet the licencing system was far from adequate to cope with the
pressure on imports. While the pressure was initially vented on domestic
prices, this in turn shifted the demand for imports outward, resulting in an
unsatisfied demand for imports at the tariff inclusive price which was even
greater than the initial excess demand. The result was rising pressure on the
licencing system. By 1965 as we noted above (section 11-5) the licencing
system had almost completely broken down. The reason for this failure of the
licencing system goes beyond mere corruption on the part of administrators:
the relative price difference had grown so large that major internal forces
were clamoring for a relaxation of licencing.88 Had reduced aggregate de-
mand policies and/or a realistic effective exchange rate facing imports been
used to dampen the demand for imports, the licencing system would not have
had to bear the pressure which it ultimately proved it could not withstand.
Put another way, licencing could be used to limit imports for an extended
period only when apparently redundant instruments such as tariffs and re-
duced aggregate demand are also employed.
Thus, our hypothesis is that the import system worked in a way that the
level of aggregate demand in current prices was the major determinant of the
level of imports. Licencing may have had some negative effect on imports,
but was not the sole determinant. Rather, the import system generally re-
sponded to increased aggregate demand by increasing imports in much the
same way as before the introduction of licencing. To test this we expressed
the relationship in the following linear form: 89
where M = c.iS. value of imports of goods at current prices, millions of
88. See Tony Killick, "The Purposes and Consequences of Import Controls in Ghana,"
op. cit.
89. Because we are considering total merchandise imports rather than some subset. we
chose to use a highly aggregated indicator of demand pressure (GDP in current
prices) as an explanatory variable. Real and price components, private and public
components, consumption and investment components, are all lumped together in
the one explanatory variable. The overall relationship masks changing composition
of imports and of GDP. Work by J.L.S. Abbey and C.S. Clark is currently underway
at the University of Western Ontario on a macroeconomic model of Ghana which,
among other things, will provide disaggregated import functions. Our purpose here is
far more limited: to give a descriptive first approximation of how the import system
workeil.
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(Table A-4a), GDP =grossdomestic product at current prices, millions of
(Table IV-2), DLIC =1for all years licencing enforced (1962, 1963, 1964,
1966) and zero for all other years. Ideally we would want a constant price
series for imports. Since such a series is not available for the entire period we
are interested in, we have specified the value of imports in current c.i.f. prices
on the grounds that there has not been any major variation in the foreign
prices of imports facing Ghana.9°







The coefficient for GDP is significant at the 1-percent level, while that of
DLIC only at the 15-percent level. The Durbin-Watson test is inconclusive.
This result suggests that the system permitted imports to respond significant-
ly to GDP in current prices, and somewhat less precisely to licencing. It is
important to note that this estimated relationship does not represent an
import demand function, but rather is simply a description of the behavior of
the import system which operated prior to 1967.
To sum up, the strategic choice made in 1961 to opt for direct controls of
both exports and imports resulted in the venting of aggregate demand pres-
sure on domestic prices. This, in the absence of compensatory policies, led to
an immediate deterioration of non-cocoa exports and eventually to a cessa-
tion of new cocoa plantings. At the same time the system of direct controls
proved inadequate to contain the pressure of domestic demand, which with-
out a sufficiently high effective exchange rate facing imports resulted in a
continuing high level of imports.
Aggregate demand and hence, in a world of controls, relative prices in the
domestic economy proved to be powerful forces affecting the performance of
exports and the level of imports. Neglect of these forces to concentrate on
symptomatic treatment by attempting direct control resulted in unsustainable
balance-of-payments deficits. By the end of 1966 it was clear that something
drastic had to be done, and done soon.
90. Note that the exchange rate remained unchanged during the period considered in
the regression.
L